How can post-conflict militaries with a history of politicized oppression and exclusion achieve professionalization? National armies face a number of challenges at the end of internal conflicts, including, but not limited to, structural reforms 1 , integration of new actors, such as former rebels and/or underrepresented groups 2 , and most often a restrained budget from a war-tired state 3 . On top of these more practical challenges (which nevertheless imply a new type of mentality), the army may also face an identity crisis as its earlier links with the governing regime have been cut off, creating a new, politically independent institution. But to what extent can a post-conflict army, previously a central actor in a civil war, adhere to international standards for a professional army, including depoliticization from domestic politics?
In this article we examine the Burundian army's trajectory from a perspective of longue durée, studying its role in and for the state since the proclamation of the Burundian Republic in 1966 through the civil war in the beginning of the 1990's to the current political crisis, which started in 2015 with the President's decision to go for a contested third term. The case of Burundi is interesting, because contrary to other states where rebels have become rulers after taking the complete control of the state apparatus 4 , in Burundi, the former rebels have accessed power following detailed power-sharing arrangements with the former government, including the loyalist army. One of the aims of this detailed power-sharing mechanism, and arguably its major achievement, has been the creation of an integrated and depoliticized national defence force.
In this article, we examine how this experiment developed by consulting primarily historical and contemporary documents and academic articles, complementing the findings with over 50 interviews conducted with Burundian soldiers between 2011-2014 by the three authors.
The aim of the article is to increase understanding of how, and to what extent, the Burundian army has managed to professionalize after the end of the civil war in the beginning of the 2000's, in spite of its violent and exclusionary history. In doing this, we aim to identify and analyse the conditions, processes and actors that have influenced the Burundian army's trajectory toward a limited professionalization.
We argue that the Burundian army has managed to professionalize and depoliticize to a limited extent (and with important constraints) following the end of the civil war due to three factors: 1) an important pre-war heritage of a technically and functionally professional, yet politicized army; 2) a favourable domestic political climate where the army no longer needs to play a political role but can take on the role of the domestic peacemaker 5 ; 3) significant external training and support related to peacekeeping deployment and Security Sector Reform (SSR). This professionalization has however partly been reversed during the recent crisis starting in 2015, showing the fragility of a post-conflict professionalization where ties between old and new officers and political actors are revoked again.
As such, the article enters into the literature of military professionalization, an area which in recent years has been given new attention for several reasons, including, but not limited to, the military's new roles due to emerging security threats such as terrorism 6 , the large amount of new troop contributing states to peace operations 7 , the increased focus on peacekeepers' human rights abuses 8 , but also the many new human rights courses and civil-military educations 9 which the military is subject to in various settings. Yet professionalization of the military is important to study, not only for its impact on peacekeeping missions, but also for its domestic role. This is especially so for post-conflict armies, which have been important actors during previous conflicts and which require new identities and new roles to function in a society recovering from conflict. This article contributes to this relatively new and underresearched topic of how post-conflict militaries can professionalize and find new identities in the aftermath of civil wars 10 .
The article is structured as follows. Firstly, we analyse and interpret the meaning of military professionalization through a literature review of military professionalization, both examining the literature from before the end of the Cold War and looking into the relatively recent SSR literature. We also attempt to clarify the relationship between professionalization and politicization in this section. In a second part we examine the Burundian army's political role since the instauration of the Burundian republic in 1966, and its relation to professionalization. Third, we look at the army's new political roles as a domestic peacemaker and an international peacekeeper after the end of the civil war and examine how these roles have opened up new opportunities for professionalization. Finally, we look at the effects of the current political crisis in Burundi on the army in terms of professionalization and attempt to draw wider conclusions from the case of Burundi.
I. Unpacking the relation between Military Professionalization and Politicisation
Military professionalization is a concept, which has been employed to capture both a necessary and a desirable modernization of the armed forces, yet surprisingly little is published on the details of such a process. 23 . Professionalism began to be used as a discourse to promote and facilitate particular occupational changes by politicians and military advisers 24 . This has taken its most visible expression in the emergence of the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR).
The Security Sector Reform (SSR) literature often refers to 'professional military' as part of the objective with SSR 25 . It prescribes norms and rules for the military institution in general which should deliver security effectively and efficiently, consistent with democratic norms and the principles of democratic governance, rule of law, and human rights in a transparent system 26 . The security forces should be professional, subordinate and accountable to civilian authorities and fulfil their mandate in accordance with international and constitutional law 27 .
The principle of military subordination and depoliticization remains thus a crucial component of today's ideal of professionalization in the SSR literature, yet these concepts are embedded in a larger normative context where the civil-military relations should be democratic and transparent 28 .
There is also a managerial side to the discourse of professionalism, inherent in the SSR language of an efficient and effective military. Evetts describes it like this:
Professionalism in the armed forces includes budgetary constraints and financial cut-backs; strict control of armaments and equipment costs; a decrease in numbers of personnel which at the same time is a more highly trained and disciplined work force; an increase in organizational features in the military which include an increase in bureaucracy, managerialism, accountability and audit; an enlarged and expanded role which includes global policeman alongside defensive and offensive combatant functions; and an international, as well as a national, identity to make more efficient organizational use of scarce defence resources 29 .
An additional aspect of professionalization is therefore related to the military's technical capacity and refers to the introduction of modern military equipment, established procedures for recruitment and promotions and advanced training 30 . Complete professionalization refers thus to both an integration of a particular military ethos defined as a group of shared values, including the acceptance of subordination under civilian authorities, and a modernisation and restructuration of the armed forces to make it capable, efficient and functional 31 .
II. A Historical Glance at the Burundian Army's Professionalization
The Burundian military has been a factor of political tension and violence since Burundi In its quest for order, legitimacy and political survival, the military regime violently deterred any attempts of Rwanda-inspired revolutions. This culminated in the "selective genocide" in 1972 when tens of thousands of Hutu civilians were killed by the army and Hutu militaries were expelled from the military institution 34 . As such, the army became known as the "monoethnic Tutsi army". The military's role was key to the political survival of the minority Tutsi regime 35 and was thus far from a neutral and independent institution. The oppression of
Hutus and the ethnic tension that followed lasted more than 15 years, with several incidents of mass killings 36 .
Yet, while the military remained heavily politicized, it was a professional army in the sense that the army members shared a professional identity, associated with common experiences, understandings and expertise, shared ways of perceiving problems and their possible 
III. The army's new roles as a domestic peacemaker and an international peacekeeper
The combination of a domestic environment in which the army could step back from its earlier political role, together with new incentives to professionalize through internationally sponsored SSR-courses and pre-deployment formations for international peace operations gave the FDN the possibility to depoliticize and submerge into all aspects of professionalization, normative, managerial and technical. In particular, its new, integrated status gave way to a more balanced and neutral role.
The new FDN reflected the army's central role in the domestic peacebuilding process with a rather sophisticated balance in the official positions between the former army and the former rebels, but also between different communities and regions of the country 42 . Several parallel processes have had positive influence for the army's integration process at large, which has been considered as a success story by academics and practitioners alike 43 , including halted forced demobilisation and the implementation of international programs, allowing large financial and technical influx. The integration of former rebels in the army also removed the mono-ethnic characteristic from the institution and made a politically neutral army more feasible, especially given political parties' strong ethnic bases 44 . These quotas between ex-FAB and ex-rebels were also present within the Burundian contingents in Somalia, as an institutional mark of the Burundian army's expertise in power-sharing mechanisms but also as a symbol for the overall peace process in Burundi 45 .
(i) From the domestic role of a military ruler to the one of peacemaker
The new ethnically representative FDN became the subject for more intensive technical constituted an important opportunity, particularly for the former rebels to compensate their lack of formal education and get necessary qualifications 47 .
The peacekeeping experience itself, which primarily has taken place in a hostile environment in Somalia, has offered an opportunity to put these new skills into practice in extreme operational conditions. The fact that Burundian soldiers trained the Somalian army and guarded the presidential palace in Mogadishu appears to be proof of their technical reliability 48 . The long-lasting deployment to international peace operations has thus given the Burundian troops some international recognition. The Burundian army, which up until its first deployment mainly had been turned inwards to deal with domestic problems, now turned outwards, working with international counterparts in new settings.
(ii) Professional and financial opportunities for the individual soldier
The army's new role as a 'peacekeeping army' also implied new opportunities for the individual soldier. Participation to international peacekeeping generates important incomes.
These remunerations have eased many of the tensions related to the integration between rebels and former government forces, and permitted individuals to look forward to a financially more stable future 49 . Waiting for one's turn to be deployed in peace operations abroad has thus become an additional reason for staying in the army. Another important aspect related to peacekeeping experience concerns the soldiers' professional expectations.
Many of our respondents envisioned an international civilian career in the future, as they could work along and build rich networks among international peace and security practitioners 50 . Courses, certificates and diplomas acquired during peacekeeping predeployment training were seen as important steps on the way to an international career.
However, some interviewees also revealed the flop side of such expectations. Burundian officers (specialised in International Humanitarian Law, for example) who had expected to pursue a career in the field of peace and security after their first deployment to Somalia realised how rare these opportunities were, particularly when lacking a political network.
External incentives and domestic possibilities aligned thus in the aftermath of the civil war for a complete professionalization of the Burundian army. Yet, the professionalization faced a number of tests resulting from a continuously fragile and tense domestic environment, including a staged coup attempt 51 , political assassinations by members of the army 52 and distribution of arms to the militias 53 amongst others. However, while the army relatively successfully has managed to divert such threats to its professionalization, the latest challenge in the shape of the Burundian President's decision to run for a contested third term has provoked more visible cracks in the army's professionalization, and opened rooms for repoliticization.
IV. The Burundian Integrated Army Faces a Disintegrated Political Deal: New Calls for

Re-Politicization
The most serious challenge to the Burundian army's professionalization came in April 2015
in the shape of the President's bid for a third term considered by opponents (and many external observers) to be unconstitutional. The army remained neutral at the beginning of a period with massive demonstrations whereas the police showed its pro-government stance in violent crackdowns on demonstrators 54 . At some point the military was also seen protecting civilians from police violence 55 . This could indicate that the military had integrated civilian values from its different educations related to SSR and peacekeeping. It also showed how the police force alongside the SNR (Service National de Renseignements), the intelligence service, was the most politicized security forces in Burundi, clearly supporting the regime. In The event on the 11 th of December in 2015 was the watershed event when it comes to mass violence in this latest crisis. As rebels attacked three military bases and 8 members of the security forces were killed, the latter responded with summary killings and sexual violence in neighbourhoods with a large number of government opponents 62 . Although the term 'security forces' refers to both police and army, it seems unlikely that the army was not involved in any of the violence. Especially not so as witnesses reported of nine mass graves, including one in a military camp 63 . The current political crisis has therefore offered a window of opportunity to different actors (military actors, political actors and civil society organisations) to engage in the politicization of the army.
In the wake of the 11-12 December massacre in Bujumbura, and after international pressure, the Peace and Security Council of the AU decided to send a peace support operation to
Burundi: "Mission Africaine de Prévention et de protection au Burundi" (MAPROBU). For the AU, this unprecedented move was made to prevent another genocide on the continent 64 .
Two days after this statement, the Burundian government organized a campaign against MAPROBU, arguing that sending a peace operation could destabilize the sovereignty of Burundi. Moreover, Burundi as a troop contributing country (TCC) was not in need of external peacekeepers on its own territory 65 . The government framed the opposition to the peace operation in terms that made the intervention more about the Burundian army's capacity as a military than about the political crisis, thereby withdrawing attention from the government's role. During several weekends, demonstrations were held in all provinces by the ruling party CNDD-FDD to "support the Burundian army" and resist an intervention. The army's peacekeeping role was central in the slogans chanted throughout towns and provinces:
"Our security forces who are peacemakers around the world, cannot commit crimes against their fellow citizens. They have been acting with efficiency against terrorists as they did in elsewhere in Somalia, Mali, and Central African Republic." 66 The ruling party's mobilization and refusal of the AU intervention underlined the possibility of re-politicizing the army.
Apart from the ruling party, civil society organizations have also participated in attempts at politicizing the army since the beginning of last crisis. One such attempt was the social media movement "bringbackoursoldiers", which asked for the return of the soldiers deployed to AMISOM in Somalia 67 . The movement was launched on social medias such as Twitter and 
IV. Conclusion
The Burundian army today has committed several human rights abuses against opponents of the current government, which suggests that the army no longer can be considered as depoliticized. Its involvement in politics also means that its professionalization process, at least partially, has come to a stop. However, it should also be kept in mind that the army remains subordinate to the civilian authority, in spite of the fact that it no longer can be considered democratic. The fact that the army has not disintegrated completely (yet) is another factor which provokes the question of whether this is a sign of professionalization or just politicization. If the army imploded now, it would most certainly develop into a civil war. From one point of view then, a unified army saves lives. Yet, if the army maintains its loyalty to the current regime and continues to (in) directly support human rights abuses against its opponents, it can no longer be considered professional.
This article has evoked questions related to the relationship between an army's professionalization and (de)politicization. A quick look at the current state of affairs in subSaharan Africa today, suggests that this is a timely topic. Not only because the domestic relationships between armies and regimes in the region of the Great Lakes are intricate and complex, but also because external assistance such as pre-deployment training and SSR processes put pressure on the armies to reform and conform to international standards of professionalization. In this paper we have provided an analysis of the Burundian army's professionalization and (de) politicization during the past 15 years and highlighted some of the complexities that these processes evoke but more research into this topic is needed in order to understand more completely the challenges a post-conflict, troop contributing army stands before.
